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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the lynchpin of 
federal regulation of illegal immigration, has failed, and as a result, the 
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State of Arizona has taken action on its own.1  This action flies in the 
face of conventional thought about the role of states in regulating 
immigration, not to mention the Constitutional directive that 
immigration is the exclusive province of the Congress.2  Arizona’s hope 
is that Congress will reform immigration law to be more effective and 
successful in protecting the country’s borders; however, Arizona is 
unwilling to do nothing in the meantime.3  In July 2007, the Arizona 
Legislature enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act (“the Act” or  “the 
Arizona Act”), which imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly 
or intentionally hire illegal immigrants.4  The statute was met 
immediately by a wave of lawsuits.5  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the statute despite these facial challenges in Chicanos Por La 
Causa v. Napolitano.6 
In upholding the Legal Arizona Workers Act, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has allowed Arizona to put the burden of determining 
 
 1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a to 1324c (1996); Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor, Ariz., to Jim 
Weiers, Speaker of the House, Ariz. House of Representatives (July 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Chapter_Laws/2007/48th_Legislature_1st_Regular_Session/
CH_279.pdf. 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization  . . . . “); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (recognizing that immigration 
law, specifically “governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders” is a power 
committed to the federal government . . . “only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a 
State”). 
 3. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1.  See also infra notes 59-63 
and accompanying text.  The question of what to do about the influx of illegal immigrants has 
plagued the federal government for years.  See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5655; infra note 31 and accompanying text.  While whether illegal 
immigration itself is a “problem” is debatable, there is no question that it is a problem in the eyes of 
a large proportion of United States citizens.  See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Times/Bloomberg Poll; 
Most Back Tighter Border and a Guest-Worker Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A1.  The Los 
Angeles Times poll found that 84 percent of people surveyed thought illegal immigration to be a 
problem and 31 percent thought it to be a major problem.  Id.  Politicians live on votes and if nearly 
a third of voters believe illegal immigration to be a big problem, that is surely enough of a voting 
block to get politicians to trumpet illegal immigration as a crisis.  See id. 
 4. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-211 to -216 (2008).  See also infra Part II.D.  The Arizona 
Legislature overwhelmingly passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act.  ARIZONA STATE 
LEGISLATURE SENATE RESEARCH, FINAL AMENDED FACT SHEET FOR H.B. 2779, 1st. Sess. (June 
22, 2007), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/48leg/1r/summary/s.2779approp_aspas
sedbyleg.doc.htm.  The statute passed the Arizona House of Representatives by a vote of forty-
seven in favor, eleven against, with two abstentions.  Id.  It passed the Arizona Senate twenty in 
favor, four against, with six abstentions.  Id. 
 5. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040-
41 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 
2008).  See also infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 6. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861.  See also infra Part II.D. 
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the legal status of employees where it belongs, with the employer, who 
is unquestionably in the best position to determine the legal status of 
potential employees.7  Additionally, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, in 
forcing employers to verify the legal status of employees, advances 
Congress’s objectives to eliminate unauthorized alien employment by 
attacking the sources of employment without conflicting with the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).8  The court’s 
decision also reaffirms the fundamental principles of federalism, under 
which the Supreme Court has long recognized that state governments 
can regulate concurrently with the federal government unless Congress 
decides “to displace local law or the necessity for the Court to invalidate 
local law because of the dormant national power.”9 
Arizona’s efforts to prod Congress into reforming immigration law 
were spearheaded by Arizona’s then-Governor, Janet Napolitano.10  
During her two terms as governor, Napolitano fiercely criticized the 
federal government for its failures to both enforce and reform 
immigration law.11  When nominated by President Barack Obama to be 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, Napolitano’s experience with 
immigration issues led to support from both Democrats and 
Republicans, including former Presidential candidate John McCain.12  If 
the Arizona Act and her comments about it are any indication, Secretary 
Napolitano will likely push for more federal-state cooperation on 
immigration.13  Eventually, then, she will be able to push for the 
 
 7. See infra notes 108-24 and accompanying text. 
 8. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866. 
 9. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 
How. 299, 318-21 (1852)).  See also infra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.  In particular, see 
infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1. 
 11. E.g., Daniel González and Sean Holstege, Napolitano Pick Signals Moderate Immigration 
Approach, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/11/21/20081121borderpolicy1121.html.  Among the 
things she criticized the government about was the removal of the National Guard from the Mexican 
border without completing the border fence and the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005.  Id.  
Napolitano was also critical of federal immigration policy generally, perhaps especially IRCA.  See 
Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1. 
 12. See Jim Abrams, Senate Approves 6 Obama Cabinet Picks, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 
2009, at B4.  Napolitiano was among six nominees that were confirmed “with a single voice vote” 
hours after Obama took office.  See also Jacques Billeaud, McCain to seek 5th Senate term, FT. 
WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 2008, at 9A (McCain said he would seek Napolitano’s confirmation, 
saying that she is “highly qualified for the job.”). 
 13. See infra notes 168-185 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive reform she has long advocated, and the absence of which 
made the Arizona Act necessary.14 
Part II of this note will explore the background of the issues 
involved in Chicanos Por La Causa by looking at them through the lens 
of federal immigration policy.15  This will include an in-depth 
assessment of IRCA, including the goals and policies that drove 
Congress to enact it.16  The discussion will then delve into the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and the 
new employee verification system that accompanied it.17  Next, this note 
will examine federal-state cooperation under IRCA.18  The background 
will then conclude with a look at the Legal Arizona Workers Act.19 
Part III of this note will analyze Chicanos Por La Causa v. 
Napolitano, including the facts, procedural history, issues raised, and the 
circuit court opinion.20  Part IV will analyze the circuit court’s decision 
and explain why it was correct.21  This will include a discussion of the 
burden the Act imposes on employers.22  It will also examine the 
decision’s repercussions for federalism in immigration, including a 
discussion of the legal and practical reasons for non-preemption.23  The 
analysis will then briefly examine Secretary Napolitano’s priorities as 
head of Homeland Security, and the new avenues for immigration 
reform that the Ninth Circuit’s decision potentially creates for her.24  The 
analysis will conclude with a look at the benefits of the court’s decision 
and the potential impact it will have on the present and future of 
immigration law in the United States.25  Part V concludes that this case 
is an important first step toward comprehensive reform of federal 
immigration law.26  It also concludes that there is a potential for even 
greater benefits from the court’s decision in the future.27 
 
 14. See Napolitano Pick Signals, supra note 11.  See also Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim 
Weiers, supra note 1. 
 15. See infra notes 28-63 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 64-123 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 124-233 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 144-96 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 203-33 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 234-53 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 240-43, 45 and accompanying text. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Federal Legislation on Employment of Illegal Immigrants 
Congress enacted the first law punishing employers for hiring 
illegal immigrants in 1986.28  Earlier laws, while punishing 
“importation, transportation, and harboring of undocumented aliens,” 
expressly excluded employment from their sanctions.29  The new law, 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, “‘forcefully’ made 
combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘[t]he policy of 
immigration law.’”30  The reasoning behind finally sanctioning 
employers was to end “the magnet” that brings undocumented aliens to 
the United States.31 
IRCA provides for both civil and criminal sanctions against 
employers who knowingly hire, recruit, or refer unauthorized aliens for 
employment.32  Congress believed punishing employers would stop them 
from hiring unauthorized aliens.33  The lack of available employment 
was then expected to lower the number of immigrants coming to the 
United States illegally.34  As previous efforts to control the flow of 
 
 28. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 45 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649.  “The 
bill establishes penalties for employers . . .” (emphasis added)  Id.  None of the previous 
congressional acts dealing with illegal immigration dealt directly with employers in this way.  See, 
e.g. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I); Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant at 21, Chicanos 
Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-17272, 07-17274, 08-15357, 08-
15359, 08-15360), 2008 WL 2131124.  
 29. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 52.  The earlier law was the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952.  Id. at 51-52.  Despite being explicitly excluded from the 1952 Act as passed, employer 
sanctions were proposed at the time.  Id. at 51. 
 30. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).  In Hoffman 
Plastic, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had awarded back pay to an unauthorized 
immigrant who was fired prior to being found to be working in the United States illegally for 
participating in the organizing of a union.  Id. at 140.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled 
that back pay could not be awarded to a worker who was never legally allowed to work in the 
United States.  Id.  The Court reasoned that the NLRB was “foreclosed by federal immigration 
policy,” particularly IRCA, from awarding such backpay.  Id.   
 31. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 45-46.  The language of the purpose section of the House 
Report leaves no doubt that the House believed employers to be at fault with regard to the presence 
of unauthorized aliens working in the United States.  See id. 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (1996) (criminal penalties); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e)(4), 1324a(g)(2) 
(civil penalties).  See also H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46. 
 33. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46.  The falsity of this belief was part of the reason the state of 
Arizona enacted the Arizona Legal Workers Act.  See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
 34. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46.  Congress also hoped that limiting the flow of illegal 
immigration would allow more immigrants to enter the country legally.  Id.  IRCA also made 
“limited” changes to the legal immigration process.  Id. at 45.  A further reason for IRCA’s adoption 
was that Congress felt that continued illegal immigration would lead to widespread resentment of 
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illegal immigration had failed, Congress created IRCA as a major 
overhaul of federal immigration law and policy.35  Prior to IRCA’s 
passage, Congress had struggled for years to develop and enact 
comprehensive immigration reform.36  Despite extensive cooperation 
between Congress and the executive branch, little effective action was 
taken on the issue of illegal immigration.37  With the passage of IRCA, 
Congress hoped employers would lose the incentive to hire 
undocumented workers and, therefore, that such workers would not risk 
 
foreigners, whether lawfully admitted or not.  Id. at 46.  As we have seen in the decades since, as 
Americans have become increasingly paranoid of immigrants, legal or otherwise, Congress’s fear of 
this attitude was justified.  See, e.g., Ediberto Román, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841 
(2008) (discussing American attitudes towards immigrants, particularly Latin American illegal 
immigrants); Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights: The Evolution of Private Racist 
Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7 NEV. L. J. 895 (2007) (discussing the anti-
immigrant sentiments behind the push for English-only language legislation). 
 35. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51-56.  Congress had been trying to deal with illegal 
immigration since the early 1950s with limited success.  Id. at 51.  Congress even made attempts in 
the early 1950s to penalize employers for hiring unauthorized aliens as part of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952.  Id. at 51-52.  However, the resulting legislation penalized only “the willful 
importation, transportation, or harboring” of illegal immigrants.  Id. at 52.  Those offenses were 
felonies and were punishable by a fine and/or up to five years in prison.  Id.  Employment, however, 
was exempted from these sanctions under what was known as the ‘Texas proviso.’”  Id.  Bills 
sanctioning employers for knowing employment of illegal immigrants passed the House of 
Representatives during both the 92nd and 93rd Congresses.  Id.  Similar to IRCA, the aim of these 
bills was to take away the incentive for illegal aliens to come to the United States while 
simultaneously removing  “the incentive for employers to exploit this source of labor.”  Id.  The 
Senate did not act on either of the bills, though both received the support of the executive branch.  
Id.  The House of Representatives tried again during the 94th Congress in 1975; however, that bill 
only made it passed the subcommittee stage and never received action by the full House.  Id.   
 36. See id. at 51-56.  Previous to the 99th Congress’s passage of IRCA, immigration reform 
had been a major focus of the 95th, 97th, 98th, and 99th Congresses.  Id. at 53-56.  Before the 95th 
Congress, meaningful immigration reform was more of a concern of the Executive Branch than the 
legislature, particularly during the Ford and Carter Administrations.  Id. at 53. 
 37. In 1975, President Gerald Ford created a cabinet-level committee to study the impact of 
undocumented aliens.  Id.  After nearly two years of study the executive committee, like the House 
of Representatives, recommended sanctioning employers.  Id.  In 1977, “President Carter proposed 
civil penalties for the employment of undocumented aliens [and] increased Southwest border 
enforcement.”  Id.  Carter’s proposal ended in Senate Judiciary Committee hearing but nothing else.  
Id.  Congress continued to work with the Carter administration, however, by creating the “Select 
Commission on Immigration  and Refugee Policy.”  Id.  The committee’s task was to study 
immigration policy and recommend “legislative and administrative change[s].”  Id.  The result of 
this committee was a recommendation for employer sanctions, just as the House of Representatives 
and the President had been working toward all along.  Id.  Finally, in 1981, the 97th Congress held 
joint subcommittee hearings on immigration for the first time since 1951.  Id. at 54.  The bill stalled 
in various committees and received alterations before finally transforming into the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act.  Id. at 54-56. 
6
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coming to the United States (or violating their status once admitted) in 
the absence of a certain job market.38 
Congress built into IRCA’s statutory scheme the necessary 
requirement that employers verify the employability of their employees 
before hiring them.39  At the time of IRCA’s enactment, this requirement 
meant mainly that the employer had to examine the documentation of 
potential employees and fill out a form verifying that she believed that 
documentation to be authentic.40  With limited exceptions, all that is 
required to escape IRCA liability is to make a good faith effort to 
comply with its mandates.41  If it reasonably appears that the employee is 
authorized to work in the United States, the employer is not subject to 
IRCA’s sanctions.42 
B. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 and the New Landscape of Employment Verification 
IRCA’s initial employment verification system, the I-9 system, was 
paper-based.43  However, the I-9 system was “undermined by fraud.”44  
As part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress instituted three “pilot programs” for 
 
 38. See Steiben v. INS, 932 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 1991) (discussing Congress’s rationale 
for imposing sanctions on employers for knowingly hiring illegal immigrants). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1996).  This verification requirement existed even before the 
establishment of the E-Verify system, which was not developed until 1996.  See Pub. L. No. 104-
208,  §§ 401-405, 110 Stat. 3009-655 to 3009-665 (1996) (note following 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1).  Further requirements also included the employee himself 
attesting to her right to legally work in the United States and retention of the employee verification 
forms for a specified period of time.  8 U.S.C. §1324a(b)(2), (3). 
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6).  These exceptions include only failure to correct noncompliance 
and “engaging in a pattern or practice of violations . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(B), (C). 
 42. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6).  IRCA’s definition of “unauthorized alien”: 
As used in this section, the term “unauthorized alien” means, with respect to the 
employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by 
this chapter or by the Attorney General. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).  “I-9” was simply the name of the form that had to be filled out and 
filed.  See Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. 
Ariz. 2007).  The I-9 process is subject to both “document and identity fraud, allowing upwards of 
eleven million unauthorized workers to gain employment in the United States . .  .”  Ariz. 
Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (D. Ariz. 2008), 
aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 44. Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 973.  The district court identifies two types of 
fraud that appear to be especially common with the I-9 system.  Id.  The first type is document 
fraud, where “employees present counterfeit or invalid documents.”  Id.  The second type is identity 
fraud, where employees provide someone else’s documents.  Id. 
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employment verification.45  Of those three pilot programs, the basic pilot 
program (since renamed “E-Verify”) is the preferred employment 
verification program of the federal government.46  E-Verify is a free, 
internet-based verification system employers may use.47  Many 
employers have chosen to enroll in E-Verify while others have not.48  E-
 
 45. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996) (note following 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a).  These programs were (1) the basic pilot program, (2) the citizen attestation pilot program, 
and (3) the machine-readable-document pilot program.  Id.  Each of these programs operates using 
similar procedures.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(b), (c), 110 Stat. 3009-662 to -663.  These 
procedures require employers to collect information, such as social security numbers or an 
identification or authorization number provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (or, 
since 2001, the Department of Homeland Security).  Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 401-405, 110 Stat. 
3009-655 to -665, amended by  Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 Stat. 2407; Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 
2-3, 117 Stat. 1944.  The collected information is then recorded on an I-9 form and submitted for 
confirmation.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403, 110 Stat. 3009-659 to -663.  Under the citizen attestation 
pilot program, an employer did not have to verify some workers’ authorization if the individual 
attested to United States citizenship “under penalty of perjury on an I-9 or similar form which form 
state[d] on its face the criminal and other penalties provided under law for a false representation of 
United States citizenship.” § 403(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 662.  This program was required for 
implementation in at least five states that issue photo identification with security features.  Pub. L. 
No. 104-208,  § 401(c)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-656;  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(b)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 
3009-662.  The machine-readable-document pilot program was required for implementation in at 
least five states that issue identification that includes “a machine-readable social security account 
number.”  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401(c)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-656; Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 403(c)(2), 
110 Stat. 3009-663.  Employers were required to scan the machine-readable features to verify 
eligibility for employment.  § 403(c)(3), 110 Stat. at 663.  Employers who relied on the information 
provided by any of the three pilot programs were protected from liability for reliance on information 
provided by the verification system.  § 403(d), 110 Stat. at 663.   
 46. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: E-Verify, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1185221678150.shtm (last visited July 27, 2009).  
Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security refers to E-Verify as “the best means available 
for determining employment eligibility.”  Id.  Furthermore, President George W. Bush issued 
Executive Order 13,465, amending Executive Order 12,989, on June 6, 2008, which required the 
Department of Homeland Security to designate an electronic verification system which would then 
be mandatory for all employers contracting with the federal government.  Exec. Order No. 13465, 
73 Fed. Reg. 33285 (June 6, 2008).  When designating a verification system, the Department chose 
E-Verify.  Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Designates E-Verify as 
Employment Eligibility Verification System for All Federal Contractors (June 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1213039922523.shtm. 
 47. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, supra note 46.  There is nothing in IRIRA 
making one particular pilot program or the other mandatory.  E.g., Answer Brief for 
Defendant/Appellee at 37-38, Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(Nos. 07-17272, 07-17274, 08-15357, 08-15359, 08-15360), available at 
http://azeir.org/pdf/defendants-answering-brief.pdf; Consolidated Opening Brief for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 38-39. 
 48. Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 973.  According to the district court’s findings of 
fact, the majority of employers who use E-Verify believe it works well.  Id. at 974.  The majority of 
those who have not enrolled cite cost concerns.  Id. at 971.  However, the benefits of enrollment for 
employers are many, including certain proof that the employer complied in good faith with the 
8
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Verify notifies employers of most employees’ statuses immediately.49  
Most employers that use E-Verify find it reliable and beneficial.50  By 
instituting E-Verify as the preferred method of employment verification, 
the executive branch is seeking to make it easier for employers to 
comply with IRCA.51  In so doing, the government’s hope is that the 
underlying purposes of IRCA will be attained more easily and 
efficiently.52 
C. Federal-State Cooperation Under IRCA 
By its plain language, IRCA preempts most state laws punishing 
employers for employing unauthorized aliens.53  Because of this 
preemption, when Congress adopted IRCA, sanctioning of employers 
became largely the responsibility of the federal government.54  In 1996, 
 
verification requirements.  Id.  An employer who does not enroll, on the other hand, is a “near 
certain” loss in any future enforcement proceeding.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 974.  Ninety-two percent of submissions are verified (or not) “within seconds.”  Id.  
Dealing with nonconfirmations can take weeks but usually takes a just a few days.  Id. 
 50. Id.  An “overwhelming” proportion of employers found it reliable in a 2002 evaluation.  
Id.  Ninety-three percent of employers found it easier than the I-9 system.  Id.  Ninety-two percent 
said E-Verify was not overly burdensome.  Id.  Of those, 60 percent said the program was “not at all 
burdensome.”  Id.  The Social Security Administration conducted a survey of fifty large-volume 
users in 2006 in which all fifty rated the E-Verify system as “‘Excellent,’” ‘”Very Good,’” or 
‘”Good.’” Id. 
 51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  The pertinent text of Executive Order 13,465 
stated:  
Executive departments and agencies that enter into contracts shall require, as a condition 
of each contract, that the contractor agree to use an electronic employment eligibility 
verification system designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the 
employment eligibility of: (i) all persons hired during the contract term by the contractor 
to perform employment duties within the United States; and (ii) all persons assigned by 
the contractor to perform work within the United States on the Federal contract. 
Exec. Order No. 13465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33285 (June 6, 2008).  By requiring verification via a 
designated system, the President made compliance quite simple, because IRCA requires only a 
“good faith attempt to comply.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6) (1996). 
 52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  See also H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 45-49 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-53 (for the underlying purposes of IRCA). 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  IRCA’s preemption provision specifically allows the imposition 
of sanctions on employers “through licensing and similar laws.”  Id.  That allowance is the fulcrum 
on which the court’s decision in Chicanos Por La Causa rests.  See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  Had Congress intended the states to have concurrent 
authority to punish employers, IRCA would not have used such a broad, sweeping provision.  Ariz. 
Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045-46 (D. Ariz. 
2008), aff’d sub nom Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856.  It is the position of this paper that 
rather than concurrent power, Congress intended the states to have complimentary power.  See infra 
Part IV.  Prior to IRCA, sanctioning employers for employing unauthorized aliens was within the 
states’ police powers.  Id. at 1041.  See also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
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Congress decided to encourage cooperation among all levels of 
government in immigration.55  Whereas IRCA specifically preempted 
nearly all state laws designed to combat illegal immigration in a similar 
way to IRCA, IIRIRA recognized cooperation as a necessary tool in 
combating illegal immigration.56  The upshot of IIRIRA’s expansion of 
federal-state cooperation is that it shows Congress’s intent to achieve its 
goals through the most efficient means possible.57  IIRIRA shows that, in 
the immigration context, Congress believes those means to be as 
inclusive as possible, “encompass[ing] federal, state[,] and local 
resources, skills and expertise.”58 
D. The Legal Arizona Workers Act 
Despite its ambitious goals, IRCA has not been successful in 
combating illegal immigration.59  In response to this alleged failure, the 
Arizona legislature enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act in July 
2007.60  The Act allows the superior court to suspend or revoke the 
 
 55. Fact Sheet: Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, (U.S. Customs and 
Immigration Enforcement August 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf.  With the passage of 
IIRIRA, Congress added section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Id.  In so doing, it 
authorizes the executive branch (now through the Department of Homeland Security) “to enter into 
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies” which permitted state and local officers 
to perform certain functions of immigration law enforcement.  Id.  Currently, at least five state 
agencies have entered into such agreements (Florida, Alabama, Arizona, North Carolina, and 
California).  Id. at 2. 
 56. See id.  Specifically, section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to delegate limited immigration authority to state and local officers, 
provided those officers receive proper training and are under the supervision of federal Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement officers.  Id at 1.  The officers selected must be citizens of the United 
States, have background checks, at least two years experience, and no pending disciplinary actions.  
Id. at 3.  The training is four weeks for correctional officers and five weeks for “field level” officers, 
with standards and testing set by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  Id. at 3.  The 
connectivity advocated under IIRIRA is especially important in more remote areas with limited 
regular federal presence.  Id. at 1. 
 57. See id.  Another example of Congress working toward cooperative efficiency can be 
found in the Clean Air Act, which allows states to implement individual plans to meet federally set 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.  42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
 58. Fact Sheet, supra note 55.  The savings clause in IRCA’s preemption provision perhaps 
foreshadows this desire for cooperative efforts.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
 59. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (D. 
Ariz. 2007). (“Current immigration laws are severely flawed and have failed to curb the flow of 
undocumented workers into the U.S.”).  See also Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra 
note 1 (this is Governor Napolitano’s Signing Statement for the Legal Arizona Workers Act). 
 60. See id.  The statute is ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-211 to -216 (2008).  There was a 
similar bill passed the previous year, which Governor Napolitano vetoed because it included the 
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business licenses of employers who knowingly or intentionally hire 
unauthorized workers.61  The Act also makes use of the E-Verify system 
mandatory.62  Frustrated with the failure of the federal government to 
comprehensively reform immigration law, the Arizona legislature 
responded in the only way it could under IRCA, by implementing a 
licensing law.63 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
In July 2007, the Arizona legislature enacted the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act.64  The Act was directed at employers of illegal 
immigrants.65  Two aspects of the Act are at issue in Chicanos Por La 
Causa.66  The first aspect is its enforcement provisions.67  These 
provisions allow the revocation of an employer’s business license if the 
business is found to knowingly or intentionally employ illegal aliens.68  
The second provision mandates the use of an electronic verification 
 
possibility of “amnesty and indemnification” for employers.  See Letter from Janet Napolitano to 
Jim Weiers, supra note 1. 
 61. §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F) (2008).  For intentionally employing unauthorized aliens, 
licenses must be suspended for a minimum of ten days, with the maximum under the discretion of 
the court for first-time offenders.  § 23-212.01(F)(1)(C).  For a second violation, all licenses at 
places where unauthorized aliens worked are revoked.  § 23-212.01(F)(2).  For knowingly 
employing unauthorized aliens, the suspension of licenses is completely discretionary; however, 
second-offense revocation is not.  §§ 23-212(F)(1)(d), 23-212(F)(2). 
 62. § 23-214 (2008).  See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra  note 1.  In her signing statement, 
Governor Napolitano admitted that immigration was “a federal responsibility,” but that it was 
“abundantly clear” that Congress was unable to provide the necessary, comprehensive reforms.  Id. 
at 1.  The Governor then described all of the bill’s weaknesses, including the lack of an exemption 
for vital industries like hospitals.  Id. at 1-2. 
 64. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 279.  See also Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 
F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 65. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860.  See §§ 23-211 to -216.  These are the statutory 
sections that make up the Legal Arizona Workers Act. 
 66. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860-61. 
 67. §§ 23-212(F),  23-212.01(F).  Section 23-212 addresses “knowing” employment of illegal 
immigrants, Section 23-212.01 addresses “intentional” employment.  §§ 23-212, 23-212.01.  The 
enforcement provisions are similar, but a violation of Section 23-212.01 carries more stringent 
penalties.  § 23-212.01(F).  Under that section, the probationary period is extended by two years.  
§23-212.01(F)(1)(b).  The section also requires courts to suspend the offending employer’s business 
license.  §23-212.01(F)(1)(c).  For “knowing” violations under Section 23-212, the suspension of 
licenses is not mandatory.  §23-212(F)(1)(d).  As of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in March 2009, the 
Act had not been enforced against any employer.  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860. 
 68. §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F) . 
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system developed by the federal government.69  Shortly after the Act’s 
enactment, businesses and civil rights groups began filing lawsuits 
challenging the Act’s constitutionality.70 
B. Procedural History 
After the initial lawsuits were dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs refiled the case, with additional plaintiffs and 
different defendants.71  The parties agreed to hold a preliminary 
injunction hearing and a trial on the merits, both of which were held on 
the same day.72  The plaintiffs alleged that federal law expressly and 
impliedly preempted the Act.73  They further contended the Act is 
 
 69. § 23-214 .  Utilization of this system, known as E-Verify, is voluntary under federal law.  
Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860.  See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. 
 70. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040-
1041 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom.  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008).  The 
district court ruled on consolidated cases.  Id.  Many more were consolidated when the case went to 
the Ninth Circuit.  Id.  In fact, the plaintiffs filed initial actions on July 13, 2007, a mere eleven days 
after the governor signed the Act.  Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 
28, at 3. 
 71. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-41.  See also Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. 
Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Ariz. 2007).  The United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the initial lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
because the plaintiffs had not named the proper defendants.  Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 
1041.  See also Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968.  The plaintiffs failed to name the county 
attorneys, who are responsible for enforcing the Act as defendants.  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 
F.3d at 862-63.  The District Court ruled that the defendants in Arizona Contractors I, the Governor, 
Attorney General, and Director of the Department of Revenue of Arizona, were not the correct 
defendants because only county attorneys could enforce the Act.  Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 
2d at 983.  The district court dismissed the case against the governor and director of the Department 
of Revenue because neither caused, or had the ability to cause, the plaintiff’s injury.  Id.  The 
district court dismissed the case against the Attorney General because he had not referred any 
employer to a county attorney for investigation or enforcement nor had he made any threats of 
enforcement on his own.  Id.  It is also questionable here whether, because the Act would not take 
effect until January 2008 (although enacted in July 2007), there existed a case or controversy, as is 
required for subject matter jurisdiction.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1040.  The plaintiffs seem to be relying on the rather thin justification of economic loss 
for the amount of money they would have to spend to comply with the E-Verify requirement.  Ariz. 
Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.  The defendants did not challenge Plaintiffs’ standing per 
stipulation but reserved the right to raise the issue on appeal.  Id. at 1041 (mentioning the stipulation 
and reservation). 
 72. Id.  
 73. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863.  The express preemption claim revolves around 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).  Id.  The preemption section of IRCA 
states: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer 
for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”  8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(2).  The implied preemption 
argument concerns the provision of the Act making usage of the E-Verify system mandatory.   
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unconstitutional because it deprives employers of a chance to be 
meaningfully heard before the State can revoke their licenses.74  The 
district court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ arguments, denied their 
request for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed the case.75  The 
plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.76 
C. Competing Arguments 
1.  Preemption 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal statutes 
preempt state statutes.77  Absent a specific provision, the determination 
of whether a state law is preempted turns on congressional intent.78  In 
 
Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863.  The plaintiffs argue that making use mandatory is 
contrary to Congress’ intent that it be voluntary.  Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56. 
 74. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 868.  The states are bound by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution not to deprive anyone of property without due process.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 75. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.  In the initial case, Plaintiffs also alleged 
violations of the Fourth Amendment and Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Arizona Constitution’s separation of powers.  Id. The plaintiffs based the separation of powers 
claim on the theory that the legislature illegally “dictate[d] the method by which the Executive 
Branch of government shall investigate.”  Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 204, Arizona 
Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Nos. CV07-1355-PHX-
NVW, CV07-1684-PHX-NVW).  The theory is that because the executive branch is charged with 
enforcement, the legislature could not tell the executive branch how to do its job by exercising de 
facto enforcement powers under the Arizona Constitution.  Id. at ¶¶ 208-09.  Plaintiffs based the 
Fourth Amendment argument on the fact that the Act makes E-Verify mandatory.  Id. at ¶¶ 216-18.  
Employers who use E-Verify agree to allow “authorized agents to make periodic visits to the 
employers, to review Basic Pilot-related records, to interview employees of the employer, and to 
inspect other employment records.”  Id. at ¶ 216.  In so doing, Plaintiffs argued, Arizona forces 
them to waive their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Id. 
at ¶ 218.  The plaintiffs dropped the Fourth Amendment and separation of powers claims by 
stipulation.  Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.  The Commerce Clause argument was 
raised because the Act’s definition of “employee” was not limited to employees hired or working 
within Arizona.  Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 122-32.  The district court rejected the 
Commerce Clause argument because “the Act does not regulate employees completely outside of 
the State.”  Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.  The Commerce Clause claim does not 
appear to have been raised on appeal.  See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856. 
 76. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) 
(“The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, 
when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the 
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’”) (emphasis added). 
 78. See Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).  This case 
discusses the three types of preemption, all of which are at issue in the present case.  Gade, 505 U.S. 
at 98.  The three types of preemption include: (1) field preemption where the federal regulatory plan 
is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” (2) conflict pre-
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IRCA, while preempting the vast majority of state laws, Congress 
explicitly carved out an important exception for “licensing and similar 
laws.”79  Thus, if the Legal Arizona Workers Act is a licensing law as 
Arizona contends, IRCA does not expressly preempt it.80  The Act could 
still be impliedly preempted, however, based upon an examination of 
IRCA’s “structure and purpose.”81  Generally, absent “clear and 
manifest” congressional intent, a presumption exists that the state law is 
not preempted.82 
The plaintiffs alleged that IRCA expressly preempts the Act.83  
Specifically, IRCA expressly preempts any state law that imposes “civil 
or criminal sanctions” against employers or recruiters of illegal 
immigrants, except “licensing and similar laws”.84  The principal IRCA-
based preemption issue in this case is whether IRCA’s licensing 
exemption covers the Act.85  The plaintiffs contended that the Act is not 
a licensing or similar law within IRCA’s meaning and that Congress did 
not intend the licensing law exception to allow a state to create its own 
enforcement system independent of IRCA.86  The gist of the plaintiffs’ 
argument was that some of the documents defined as “licenses” under 
 
emption where the state law frustrates the purposes of Congress or where compliance with both 
laws is impossible, and (3) express preemption where Congress has explicitly preempted State laws 
in its statute.  Id. 
 79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (1996).  See supra note 53.  The exception for licensing and 
similar laws is referred to as the “savings clause.”  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861.  A 
“saving clause” (sometimes “savings clause”) is a statutory provision that carves out an exception 
from the statute’s mandate for something that would normally fall within the statute’s scope.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1371 (8th ed. 2004).  Savings clauses are usually used “to preserve 
rights and claims that would otherwise be lost.”  Id. According to the House Report on IRCA: 
The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically preempt any state 
or local laws providing civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or 
referral of undocumented aliens. They are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful 
state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a 
license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in 
this legislation. Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or ‘“fitness 
to do business laws,’” such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which 
specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or 
referring undocumented aliens. 
H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. 
 80. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).   
 81. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (differentiating between express and implied preemption). 
 82. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).  This assumption applies in all cases 
involving federal legislation in areas traditionally within the police powers of the state.  Id. at 485. 
 83. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863.  See supra note 73. 
 84. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(2).  See also supra note 73. 
 85. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F. 3d at 863-64.  For the Act’s enforcement provisions, see 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-212(F) , 23-212.01(F) (2008). 
 86. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864. 
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the statute are not “licenses” within the generally accepted meaning of 
that term.87  The plaintiffs also argued for a narrow interpretation of the 
“licensing and similar laws” phrase to prevent state usurpation of federal 
authority.88 
Arizona argued that the plain language of the Act’s enforcement 
provision shows it to be a licensing law.89  The district court agreed, 
saying the provision merely imposes conditions on state business 
licenses.90  The plaintiffs countered with an argument that Congress 
meant “license” to apply only to certain professions, such as medicine 
and law, and not to businesses.91  Arizona argued that “license,” both in 
IRCA and the Act, means what it has always meant: “permission, 
usually revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be 
unlawful.”92  The plaintiffs claimed Congress intended the savings 
clause to allow state sanctions only after a determination by the federal 
government that an employer hired illegal immigrants.93  In reply, 
Arizona asserted that Congress specifically intended to allow the 
continuation of state regulation.94  The plaintiffs’ final express 
preemption argument was that the Act should be preempted because it 
might conflict with federal law when applied.95 
 
 87. Id. at 865.  The statute defines “license” as: 
[A]ny agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar form of 
authorization that is required by law and that is issued by any agency for the purposes of 
operating a business in this state.  Includes: (i) Articles of incorporation under title 10, 
(ii) a certificate of partnership, a partnership registration[,] or articles of organization 
under title 29, (iii) a grant of authority issued under title 10, chapter 15, [or] (iv) any 
transaction privilege license. 
§ 23-211(9)(a),(b). 
 88. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 
(D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856.  The district court rejected 
this argument because licensing is traditionally an area of state control.  Id. at 1050-51.  When 
Congress legislates in an area traditionally controlled by the states, there is a presumption of non-
preemption that can only be overcome by a “clear and manifest purpose” of superseding state law.  
Id. at 1044.  See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).  For a discussion of savings clauses, see 
supra note 79. 
 89. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46. 
 90. See Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.  The district court also found that “[t]he 
Act’s definition of license does not depart from common sense or traditional understandings of what 
is a license.”  Id. 
 91. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865.  The Arizona Act expressly excludes 
professional licenses. § 23-211(9)(c)(ii).   
 92. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.  For the statutory definition under the Act, 
see § 23-211(9)(a).  See also supra note 87. 
 93. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51. 
 94. Id. at 1051 (relying on DeCanas, 424 U.S. 351). 
 95. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866.  The trouble with this argument is that Plaintiffs 
only provide the court with one example of when this might happen.  Id.  Not only has this not 
15
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The plaintiffs argued that even if federal law does not expressly 
preempt the Act, it is implicitly preempted.96  This argument specifically 
addressed the Act’s mandated use of the E-Verify system.97  The 
plaintiffs contended that because Congress made use of the system 
voluntary, Arizona does not have the authority to require it.98  Arizona 
argued that Congress’s intent was to encourage use of E-Verify, and that 
there was nothing that precluded a state from making it mandatory.99 
2.  Due Process 
In addition to the preemption claim, the plaintiffs also contended 
that the Act violates employers’ due process rights by not allowing them 
to be heard prior to the State revoking their licenses.100  The Act does 
provide for a hearing before the court can impose sanctions; however, 
the plaintiffs considered the hearing meaningless.101  The plaintiffs 
contended the plain language of the statute, which allows the superior 
court to consider “only the federal government’s determination” of 
whether an employee is an unauthorized alien, prevents employers from 
challenging that determination.102 
Arizona argued that the plaintiffs focused on just the first sentence 
of Section 23-212(H).103  Read with the second sentence, the defendants 
contended, it is clear that this federal determination creates a rebuttable 
presumption that an employee is unauthorized.104  According to Arizona, 
 
actually happened, there is no indication that it will happen.  Id.  See also infra notes 123, 237-38 
and accompanying text. 
 96. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56. 
 97. Id.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 98. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56. 
 99. Id.  Indeed, E-Verify is now the federal government’s preferred employment verification 
system.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 100. Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 53-55.  For purposes 
of due process, both sides agree that a business license is a property interest that cannot be taken 
without due process.  Consolidated Reply Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant at 18, Chicanos Por La Causa 
v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-17272, 07-17274, 08-15357, 08-15359, 08-
15360), 2008 WL 2442250.  See also Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 47, at 43. 
 101. Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 54. 
 102. Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 54-55.  For the 
statutory language at issue, see § 23-212(H) (2008). 
 103. Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 47, at 44.  The first sentence of ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN.  § 23-212(H) says “[o]n determining whether an employee is an unauthorized 
alien, the court shall consider only the federal government’s determination pursuant to 8 United 
States Code § 1373(c)” (emphasis added). 
 104. Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 47, at 44.  See also Consolidated Reply 
Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 100, at 18-19.  The second sentence of § 23-212(H) says 
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this presumption can be challenged at a hearing in the superior court 
prior to the imposition of sanctions.105  The Act, they argue, does not 
violate due process because employers have sufficient opportunity to be 
heard “in a meaningful manner.”106 
D. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Decision 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Act is a licensing 
law within the meaning of the savings clause of IRCA’s preemption 
provision.107  The court found that employment was traditionally 
regulated by the states.108  According to the court, a presumption of non-
preemption applies when Congress passes laws affecting traditionally 
state-regulated areas.109  Given this presumption and the traditional 
definition of license, the court concluded that the Act fell within the 
savings clause.110  The court then disregarded the plaintiffs’ conflict 
preemption challenge, noting that a potential conflict with federal law is 
 
“The federal government’s determination creates a rebuttable presumption of the employee’s lawful 
status.” 
 105. Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 100, at 45.  See § 23-212(C), (D), (E) 
(2008).  See also § 23-212.01 (C), (D), (E) (2008). 
 106. Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 100, at 42 (quoting Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 
 107. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 864.  The case the court relies on for the proposition that employment of illegal 
immigrants is a state-regulated area is DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).  See Chicanos Por La 
Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2008).  See also supra note 54 and accompanying 
text.  In DeCanas, immigrant migrant farm laborers sued farm labor contractors alleging that the 
contractors refused them employment because of a surplus of labor.  DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353.  
The plaintiffs alleged that the surplus resulted from the knowing employment of unauthorized 
aliens, which violated a California statute.  Id.  California’s lower courts found that it was pre-
empted by federal law, specifically the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Id.  The California 
Supreme Court refused to hear the case; the United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.  
Id. at 354.  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress did not intend to pre-empt 
“harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens in 
particular.”  Id. at 358.  Most importantly, however, the Court held that states can enact such 
regulation under their traditional police powers.  Id. at 356-57.  Despite IRCA’s reformation of 
federal immigration policy, the circuit court found in Chicanos Por La Causa that DeCanas’ 
holding still controls. Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d at 984.  The court’s reasoning was that 
although IRCA made employment of unauthorized aliens central to federal immigration policy, the 
power to regulate that employment “remains within the states’ historic police powers . . . .”  Id.  See 
also supra note 30. 
 109. Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d at 979. 
 110. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 856.  The court also looked at the legislative history 
of IRCA, quoting language from House Report 99-682, which seems to eviscerate Plaintiffs’ 
express preemption argument.  Id. at 865 (discussing House Report 99-682).  The quoted language 
says, in part: “the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or “fitness to do business 
laws,” . . . which specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or 
referring undocumented aliens.”  Id. 
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insufficient to maintain a facial attack on the Act’s constitutionality, 
because a facial challenge to a statute under conflict preemption requires 
an actual conflict rather than a speculative one.111  Next, the court  
rejected the plaintiffs’ implied preemption argument, stating that 
Congress’s intent is to encourage use of E-Verify.112  The Act, according 
to the court, merely furthers that purpose.113  A state law that furthers 
Congress’s purpose is not conflict preempted.114  Plaintiffs made one last 
conflict preemption argument based upon the “potentially discriminatory 
effects” of E-Verify.115  The court rejected this argument because the 
plaintiffs failed to show that E-Verify is more discriminatory than the 
other options Congress has provided for employment verification.116 
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ due process claim.117  The 
Act, the court found, provides employers with a chance to present 
evidence at a hearing.118  The court suggested that the superior court’s 
reliance on “only” a federal determination of an employee’s status 
protects employees from State investigation.119  The court found that an 
employer’s opportunity to give evidence to rebut the presumption that an 
employee is unauthorized satisfies due process.120 
The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the district court, 
upholding the Act “in all respects.”121  However, the court was careful to 
note that its ruling only applies to facial challenges of the Act’s 
 
 111. Id. at 866. 
 112. Id. at 867.  Congress could have prohibited states from making participation in E-Verify 
mandatory but did not do so.  Id. at 866-67. 
 113. Id. at 867.  According to the court, Congress impliedly encourages use of E-Verify 
through an expansion of its availability.  Id. 
 114. Id.  “The Act’s requirement that employers participate in E-Verify is consistent with and 
furthers [Congress’s] purpose, and thus does not raise conflict preemption concerns.”  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  Because verification is required anyway, through either E-Verify or the I-9 system, 
Plaintiffs were required to show E-Verify leads to more discrimination than I-9 in order for E-
Verify to be conflict preempted.  Id. 
 117. Id. at 867-69.  The taking away of a property interest has to be preceded by notice and a 
chance to be heard.  Id. at 867.  Plaintiffs argue that the statute deprives them of this opportunity.  
Id. at 868.   
 118. Id.  (finding that employers have a chance to present evidence before the superior court). 
 119. Id. at 868-69.  Arizona’s attorneys and the court seem to be theorizing here rather than 
providing concrete evidence as to legislative intent.  See id.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 23-
212(H) (2008) (directing the superior court to look only to the federal government’s determination 
of status). 
 120. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 869.  The proceeding where they can present rebuttal 
evidence is the “‘opportunity to be heard’” that Plaintiffs feel the statute extinguishes.  Id. at 868.  
See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 121. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861. 
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constitutionality.122  In doing so, the court appears to have reservations 
about the Act’s application.123 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Despite the criticisms heaped on the Legal Arizona Workers Act, 
from both business groups and immigrants’ rights groups, its benefits far 
outweigh the issues raised by these criticisms.124  Not only does the law 
place the proper burdens where they belong, it also has an opportunity to 
lead to widespread benefits for all parties involved.125  In the plaintiffs’ 
haste to have the law overturned as unconstitutional, they have failed to 
recognize this possibility.126  By upholding the Act, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision allows Arizona to explore the potential of State enforcement in 
immigration law—a field in which federal law has failed miserably.127  
 
 122. Id.  The court is concerned enough about the potential application problems to make this 
explicitly clear very early in the opinion.  Id. 
 123. Id.  (“[W]e must observe that [this facial challenge] is brought against a blank factual 
background of enforcement and outside the context of any particular case.  If and when the statute is 
enforced, and the factual background is developed, other challenges to the Act as applied in any 
particular instance or manner will not be controlled by our decision.”).  See also infra notes 237-238 
and accompanying text.  The plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion to sustain a facial challenge to a 
statute is significantly greater than the burden of sustaining other types of challenges. Chicanos Por 
La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861. 
 124. One indication that both businesses and immigrants’ rights groups oppose the legislation 
is that both are among the various parties to the lawsuit challenging its constitutionality.  See id.  
Plaintiffs include Chicanos Por La Causa and Somos America, groups working to promote 
immigrants’ rights.  See id.  On the other hand, Plaintiffs also include many business groups such as 
Arizona Employers for Immigration Reform, Arizona Farm Bureau Federation, Arizona Restaurant 
and Hospitality Association, Associated Minority Contractors of America, Arizona Roofing 
Contractors Association, Wake Up Arizona! Inc., Arizona Landscape Contractors’ Association, and 
Arizona Contractors Association.  See id.  The criticisms are documented, albeit one-sidedly, on 
Wake Up Arizona!’s website.  Wake Up Arizona!, About the Coalition,  
http://www.wakeuparizona.org/ ?page_id=19 (last visited July 26, 2009). 
 125. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1.  These potential benefits 
will be discussed in depth later in the analysis. 
 126. See Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. 
Ariz. 2007).  “Haste” may be putting it mildly, as the first lawsuits were filed less than two weeks 
after the law was signed by Governor Napolitano.  Consolidated Opening Brief for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 53-55. See. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. 
Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, 
558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 127. Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1.  Further evidence of 
Congress’ failure is evident due to the fact that illegal immigration is still such an important, 
divisive issue over twenty years after IRCA’s enactment.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a to 1324c (1996). 
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A. The Burden on Employers 
The government, whether at the federal or state level, is not in the 
best position to determine whether potential employees are authorized to 
legally work in the United States.128  The reason is simple: the 
government is not the entity hiring these employees and does not have 
the access or the resources necessary to screen every candidate for 
employment at every business.129  By placing the burden on employers 
the Act is hardly breaking novel ground; employers are already 
responsible for their employees in various ways.130  The policy 
underlying this concept is that employers are in the best position to 
anticipate and, if necessary, control the actions of persons in their 
employ.131  These same principles are rightfully implicated when an 
 
 128. This position is analogous to the “least cost avoider” that shows up from time-to-time in 
other areas of law.  See e.g., Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 
1999) (applying “least cost avoider” rationale to contract law); Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, 762 
F.2d 444, 448 n.4 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining the principle’s importance to modern tort law).  The 
idea is that the party who can solve the problem at the lowest cost should have the burden of doing 
so.  See Holtz, 185 F.3d at 743.  Cf. Press Release, American Society of Safety Engineers, American 
Society of Safety Engineers Comment on Employer Payment for Personal Protection Equipment 
(August 31, 2004), available at http://www.asse.org/newsroom/releases/press401.htm (arguing that 
the government should not establish regulations requiring specific personal protection equipment in 
specific industries because “employers . . . are in the best position to identify and select the correct 
equipment and to maintain it properly”). 
 129. Cf. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans v. 
Norris (Arizona Governing Committee), 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).  Although Arizona Governing 
Committee was in a different context (a Title VII sexual harassment claim), the Supreme Court 
made it clear that “employers are ultimately responsible for the ‘compensation, terms, conditions, 
[and] privileges of employment’ provided to employees”  Id. at 1089 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1)).  See also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Title VII Sex Discrimination in Employment — 
Supreme Court Cases, 170 A.L.R. FED. 219 (2001).  It follows therefore that the government does 
not bear such responsibility for the employees of non-governmental entities. 
 130. Employer responsibility for employees extends to include health care law, agency law, 
tort law, and many other areas of law.  See, e.g., Nell Jean Industries, Inc. v. Barnhart, 224 F. Supp. 
2d 10 (D.D.C. 2002).  In Nell Jean Industries, the court examined the legislative history of the Coal 
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“Coal Act”).  Nell Jean Industries, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 
24.  The court found that Congress’s purpose in passing the Coal Act was to make employers 
responsible for funding health care benefits for their former employees.  See also 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 
9701 to 9722.  See, e.g., 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 2 (1986).  In agency law, an employer (principal) is 
bound by any contracts entered into by the employee-agent on the principal’s behalf.  Id.  This is 
sometimes true even when the employee-agent lacks the actual authority to bind the employer 
(principal).  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006).  See also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 17 
(1986).  In tort law, an employer is often responsible for the tortious conduct of his/her employees.  
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm 4 SC NT (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005).  See also 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2006). 
 131. See Smith v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609. (S.D. Miss. 2003); 
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding employer liable because employer “was 
in the best position to correct” the sexual harassment offenses of an employee).  Id. at 943 n.8. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss2/4
SHELLEY 4/22/2010  12:12 PM 
2010] IF YOU WANT SOMETHING DONE RIGHT 623 
employer or potential employer bears responsibility for her employees or 
prospective employees.132  There is no question that companies hiring 
new employees in Arizona are in a far better position than the 
government to assess the legal status of their new hires, not least because 
the employers, or their agents, often personally meet them.133 
One of the reasons Congress passed IRCA in 1986 was because 
most illegal immigrants come to the United States to find jobs.134  
Congress thought it “essential” that employers take responsibility for the 
people they hire.135  With the Act, Arizona is simply agreeing with 
Congress.136  If demand for low-cost, effective labor diminishes, it is 
very likely that the flow of undocumented aliens into the United States 
will slow considerably.137 
One of the issues employers raised with regard to the Act was the 
cost of compliance, specifically the cost of enrolling and participating in 
the E-Verify system.138  These costs include labor, equipment, and other 
expenses.139  Although the district court found in the initially filed cases 
that the cost of compliance was quite modest, the judge determined in 
 
 132. See supra note 131. 
 133. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1.  In fact, one of the 
reasons the Arizona legislature approved the Legal Arizona Workers Act was because there was a 
“constant demand” among employers for “cheap, undocumented labor.”  Id. 
 134. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 47 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5651. 
 135. Id. (“Since most undocumented aliens enter this country to find jobs, the Committee 
believes it is essential to require employers to share the responsibility to address this serious 
problem.”).  Congress likely would not have done so if it thought employers would not be helpful.  
See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I).  For Congress, the problem of illegal immigration was especially 
urgent in harsh economic times.  Id. at 47. 
 136. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1.  H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I) at 
47. 
 137. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I) at 47 .  The question has always been how to lower that demand.  
Id.  This was the whole premise behind IRCA in 1986 and remains the policy behind employer 
sanctioning today.  See President’s Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (S. 1200), 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986).  See also Letter from Janet 
Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1. 
 138. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Ariz. 
2007).  This cost, in fact, was the only injury the district court agreed gave the plaintiffs standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Act.  See id.  Even without threatened enforcement, plaintiffs 
do sometimes have standing to challenge statutes that have yet to take effect.  See Lake Carriers’ 
Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1972) (holding that the cost of compliance with a 
statute that is about to take effect satisfies the requirements of standing).  See infra note 140-143. 
 139. Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 974, 979.  Compliance is more expensive for some 
employers than others.  Id. at 974.  There are at least two likely reasons for this.  First, large 
companies hire more employees and would have to expend more resources verifying their legal 
status.  Second, small companies might not have had adequate equipment to comply prior to the 
Act’s enactment.  See id.  (discussing these costs). 
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the subsequent lawsuit that he had overestimated that cost.140  The 
revised average implementation cost was found to be $125, with the vast 
majority of employers spending under $100.141  The average yearly 
estimate was lowered to $728, with three-fourths of employers spending 
under $100.142  The low implementation and operating costs for the vast 
majority of employers significantly minimize the negative effect of the 
mandatory E-Verify requirement on employers.143 
B. The Rebirth of Federalism in Immigration Law 
1.  Preemption, IRCA’s Saving Clause, and Legislative History 
The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
placed federal law firmly at the forefront of national immigration 
policy.144  Prior to IRCA, the states performed many enforcement 
functions as far as immigration was concerned.145  For the most part, 
IRCA preempted all state laws that sanctioned employers for employing 
unauthorized aliens.146  However, licensing laws are specifically 
exempted from preemption.147  This exemption gave Arizona the 
 
 140. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 
(D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008).  In the 
original case, the court found the majority of employers spent less than five hundred dollars to 
implement the E-Verify system.  Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 974.  The court also found 
that most employers also spent under five hundred dollars per year to use the system.  Id.  The 
average yearly operating cost was $1800, and nearly 85 percent of employers spent under $3500.  
Id.  In the subsequent decision, the court revised its estimates.  Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1042-43.  These lower estimates were still enough to give Plaintiffs standing to challenge the Act.  
Id.  See also supra note 138. 
 141. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1042-43.  Although the actual operation does not change simply because the cost is 
less, the requirement’s economic hit to employers amounts to a minor business expense.  See id.  At 
most, the financial considerations are nothing more than a nuisance. 
 144. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 145. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-59 (1976) (holding that although the regulation 
of immigration was a power exclusive to the federal government, states could implement and 
enforce their own immigration laws so long as they did not conflict with federal laws). 
 146. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (1996).  See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.  Among 
the advantages of federal preemption is uniformity, both of the law and citizens’ expectations of the 
law.  See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660.  The 
main reason that state laws were not preempted prior to IRCA was not because the advantages of 
uniformity were not recognized but because Congress had not expressed an intent to preempt state 
law.  DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357-59. 
 147. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) 
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opening it needed to augment IRCA with the Legal Arizona Workers 
Act.148  Arizona’s legislature has enacted a licensing law.149  The 
sanctions that can be levied against employers under the Act are 
sanctions “through licensing and similar laws” because all Arizona is 
doing is deciding who can and who cannot do business within the State 
of Arizona.150 
The main thrust of the plaintiffs’ express preemption argument is 
that the Act includes some things that are not usually considered licenses 
within its definition of “license.”151  The problem with that argument is 
that the saving clause includes not just licensing laws but “similar laws” 
as well.152  The circuit court did not reach this issue, finding instead that 
Arizona’s “broad definition of ‘license’ is in line with the terms 
 
(emphasis added).  Congress expressly preserved the states’ right to decide who could and could not 
be licensed to conduct business within the state.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
 148. Answer Brief for Defendant/Appellee, supra note 47, at 19-27. 
 149. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-211 to -216 (2008).  Indeed, the main sanctions for 
violating the Act are the suspension and revocation of licenses.  §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F) (2008).  
As far as employer sanctions are concerned, the Act is, by its own terms, a licensing law.  See §§ 
23-211 to -216 (2008). 
 150. See supra note 147.  See also §§ 23-212(F),  23-212.01(F) (2008).  Despite the 
comprehensive nature of IRCA, Congress was careful to specifically preserve this authority for the 
States.  H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.  The 
plaintiffs’ argument seems to assert that states are not allowed to determine who can and cannot do 
business within the state in the immigration context.  See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 
F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008).  Only the federal government, they argue, has that authority.  Chicanos 
Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864-65.  The existence of federalism under the United States 
Constitution precludes such a result. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (“[T]he fact that aliens are the 
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under 
which a legal entrant may remain.”).  See also Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202, 225-26 (1982) (expressly 
reaffirming DeCanas).  Here, as in DeCanas, the state law in question “mirrors federal objectives 
and furthers a legitimate state goal.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).  Established Supreme 
Court precedent guarantees the states limited immigration authority under these circumstances.  
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225-26.  See also DeCanas, 424 U.S. 351.  Rather than asking the court to 
overrule precedent, however, the plaintiffs try to craft arguments to get around the issue of 
federalism, such as when they argue that Arizona did not properly define the word “license.”  
Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865.  See also infra note 151-53 and accompanying text.  
Evidently, the plaintiffs were under the misapprehension that courts do not give legislatures some 
deference.  See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959) (tax law 
context); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (criminal law context); McCreary County, Ky. 
v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 n.13 (2005) (economic law context).  
Such deference does exist, though, and the plaintiffs failed to even approach satisfying their burden 
that Arizona’s definition was unreasonable and thus not entitled to such deference.  Chicanos Por 
La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861.  Arizona’s legislature can, so long as reasonable, define “license” 
however it wishes.  See, e.g., Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (“[C]ourts should pay 
particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.”) 
 151. Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 28-30. 
 152. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2);  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863. 
23
Shelley Jr.: If You Want Something Done Right
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
SHELLEY 4/22/2010  12:12 PM 
626 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:603 
traditionally used.”153  The implied preemption issues were also 
correctly decided by the circuit court.154  The Act was not impliedly 
preempted by federal law because any conflict is “hypothetical” at this 
point.155  However, the Act is more than just not in conflict with federal 
law, it is in fact complementary to federal immigration law.156  If the Act 
is applied the way Arizona proposes, it should never be conflict-
preempted.157  Although the court does not address the issue, the Act 
should also easily avoid field preemption so long as Congress fails to 
respond to Arizona’s legitimate concerns about IRCA’s efficacy.158 
2.  The Failure of the Federal Government 
Congress passed IRCA with unquestionably good intentions.159  
Congress believed IRCA’s employer sanctions were “the most humane, 
credible[,] and effective way to respond” to the problem of illegal 
immigration.160  Unfortunately, IRCA has been a failure in this 
respect.161  In more than twenty years after its passage, IRCA has done 
 
 153. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865.  There are pros and cons to the court’s 
characterization of this particular point.  On the one hand, actual “licensing” laws will likely be far 
easier to uphold than “similar laws,” if only because there will always be arguments about what 
constitutes a “similar law.”  On the other hand, the court passed up an opportunity to define and 
clarify “similar laws.”  Right or wrong, the court’s choice will likely lead to more litigation if 
additional states attempt to implement laws like the Legal Arizona Workers Act in the Ninth 
Circuit.  See generally Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865. 
 154. There are two types of implied preemption arguments the plaintiffs made: field and 
conflict preemption.  Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 34-53  
The field preemption argument does not seem to have been addressed by the circuit court.  See 
Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856.  There were two aspects to the Plaintiffs’ conflict 
preemption argument.  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863.  First, the plaintiffs argued that the 
entire Act was conflict preempted.  Id.  Second, they argued that even if the Act was not completely 
preempted, the mandatory E-Verify requirement was preempted.  Id.  See also Consolidated 
Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 35-44. 
 155. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866.  In order for conflict preemption to work, there 
must be an actual conflict rather than simply a possible one.  Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id.  Undoubtedly, there are ways to enforce a completely non-conflicting law in 
conflicting ways; however, such enforcement would most likely fail for due process reasons, not 
conflict preemption reasons.  See id. at 867-69. 
 158. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1.  See also Consolidated 
Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant at 44-53, supra note 100. 
 159. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650.  
Congress’s hope was to “close the back door on illegal immigration.”  Id. 
 160. Id..  Congress thought that without sanctions, the influx of undocumented aliens would 
continue to rise.  Id. at 47. 
 161. Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1.  See also supra note 127; 
Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Ariz. 2007).  
Additionally, the legislative history of IRCA shows that similar sanctioning measures in other 
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little to limit the influx of unauthorized aliens.162  In fact, in March 2005, 
there were approximately seven million unauthorized aliens working in 
the United States.163  By contrast, at the time of IRCA’s enactment in 
1986, Congress estimated the number of unauthorized aliens to be 
around three million.164  Despite Congress’s best efforts, people are still 
entering the United States illegally and many enter the workforce.165  In 
her signing statement, then-Governor Napolitano said “it is now 
abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with the 
comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”166  Under such 
circumstances, it would be antithetical to the very purposes of IRCA for 
a helpful law like the Act to be preempted.167 
3.  Cooperative Federalism 
One of the major principles underlying the United States’ 
Constitution is the necessity of cooperation among federal and state 
governments.168  An important goal of our federal system is the 
formation of a “workable government,” which can best be accomplished 
through such cooperation.169  Indeed, even today there are continuing 
 
countries have proven effective, making the federal government’s failure even more resounding.  
H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 47. 
 162. See infra note 164.  See also Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 
1.  
 163. Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 973.  According to the district court’s findings, 
unauthorized aliens make up about 5 percent of the United States’ workforce.  Id. 
 164. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, 
Congressional Research Service (2004) at 1, available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/crs/CRS_undocumented_2004.pdf.  The estimates is 
this report, which ended in 2002, show two million more unauthorized aliens in 2002 than the 
district court found in 2005.  Id.  See also supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 163-64. 
 166. Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1. 
 167. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 45-49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5649-53 (for the underlying purposes of IRCA).  See also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV.  Article IV of the Constitution is swarming with required 
cooperation, giving the impression that the Framers knew a cooperative government would be the 
most effective.  Id.  For example, each state must give full faith and credit “to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings” of other states.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  The federal 
government then, through Congress, has the power to regulate that cooperation.  Id.  Article IV also 
forces states to cooperate on the extradition of fugitives and the return of runaway slaves.  U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2-3. 
 169. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates 
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”).  While Justice 
Jackson spoke of the separation of powers rather than federalism, the principle applies just as 
strongly because it is merely a further diffusion of power.  See id.  State governments and the 
federal government also enjoy the “separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” 
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calls for cooperation among the state and federal governments.170  When 
the federal government has shown it cannot solve a problem, states must 
be allowed the opportunity to step in and assist.171  Arizona has done 
nothing more than advance the goals of Congress—goals the federal 
government is unable to achieve.172  The Ninth Circuit correctly 
recognized that the Act augments IRCA rather than conflicting with it.173  
When cases like this arise, states should be able to freely exercise their 
role as laboratories in order to experiment with varying solutions to the 
complex problems presented.174  The idea that state governments can 
supplement and improve federal governance is the crux of the federal 
system.175  Acknowledging this fact makes it impossible to conclude that 
the Act is field or conflict preempted without denying the existence of 
federalism altogether.176  If states were not allowed to regulate in this 
manner, federalism would be rendered a dead letter because all the 
meaningful power (including, under Plaintiff’s argument, the power to 
 
that the three branches of the federal government share.  Id. at 635.  See also U.S. v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
 170. Stephen Kaufman, Obama, U.S. Governors Seek Cooperation on Troubled Economy, 
America.gov, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/usg-
english/2008/December/20081204171807esnamfuak0.5725214.html?CP.rss=true 
 171. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 1. 
 172. See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 173. Id.  The plaintiffs seem to have thrown out every possible argument in an attempt to get 
the law overturned prior to enforcement.  See Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
supra note 28.  Sometimes, as here, this takes on an air of ‘“grasping at straws’” rather than solidly-
based legal arguments.  See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866. 
 174. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.  This Court has the power to prevent 
an experiment.  We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in 
our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  We have power to do 
this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.  But, in the exercise of this high 
power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. 
Id.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“States may 
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best 
solution is far from clear”).  The idea of states as laboratories uses the democratic process to find 
new and innovative ways to solve difficult problems.  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 
327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing “the interest of the States to serve as laboratories for 
innovation and experiment”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(States useful as laboratories for “testing solutions to novel legal problems”). 
 175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  Cooperation was one of the keys to the “more 
perfect union” the framers hoped to create.  See U.S. CONST. pmbl.  See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 176. See supra note 78. 
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prevent a state from deciding how to license businesses within its 
borders) would be in the hands of the federal government.177  Although 
the Constitution contemplates the expansion of the federal government’s 
powers, it does not allow for the states to be prevented from helping the 
federal government effectively meet its goals.178  This is the principle of 
cooperative federalism upon which the Ninth Circuit believed the Act to 
be based.179  In fact when Congress has failed, “states like Arizona have 
no choice” other than to address the problem themselves or risk it 
becoming much more severe.180  There are, of course, many areas where 
preemption does and should rightfully apply because the federal 
government is supreme as to the state governments.181  However, 
preemption should not apply unless Congress has declared a “clear and 
manifest” purpose to control an entire area of law or when certain 
authority has been constitutionally granted exclusively to Congress.182  
Neither has happened in this case.183  The ability for states to supplement 
federal law is especially important in an area like illegal immigration 
because certain states, Arizona among them, are affected more than 
 
 177. See generally THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 (James Madison).  Indeed, this was the problem 
James Madison feared.  Id. (“The accumulation of all power . . . in the same hands, whether of one, 
or few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.”). 
 178. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“. . . the powers conferred 
upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow 
for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.”).  See also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise 
Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). 
 179. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[The Act] is 
premised on the enforcement of federal standards as embodied in federal immigration law.” ) 
(emphasis added). 
 180. Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 3. 
 181. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819) (“The government of the United States, 
then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the 
constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding.’”). 
 182. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040-
41 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856 (9th Cir. 
2008); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Of course, it has long been recognized that immigration law 
itself is the near-exclusive province of Congress.  See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
However, the Supreme Court has maintained that there are rare instances when “such matters [are] 
relevant to legislation by a State.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225.  According to the Supreme Court, “the 
States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors 
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.”  Id.  The Act easily meets both of these 
requirements.  See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856. 
 183. See Chicanos Por La Causa, 544 F.3d 976. 
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others.184  Conflict or field preemption in situations like this, where the 
State is exploring strategies to help an inefficient Congress would be 
counterproductive to the concept of federalism and would render the 
government unworkable.185 
C. Benefits of the Arizona Act 
In addition to the strictly legal reasons for the circuit court’s 
decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, there are also many benefits which 
should inure as a result of its passage.186  The main benefit of the Act is 
that it addresses illegal immigration by attacking the lure rather than the 
immigrants.187  Going after employers is the best way to control the flow 
of unauthorized aliens because with fewer jobs, the likelihood is that 
fewer immigrants would have a reason to enter the country illegally.188  
It is important to note that the state of Arizona is not by itself in 
believing employers should bear the responsibility—Congress surely 
 
 184. Steven A. Camarota, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007: A PROFILE OF 
AMERICA’S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, Table 21.  Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder 
(November 2007) available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.pdf.  The Center for 
Immigration Studies estimates that illegal immigrants constitute 9 percent of Arizona’s population 
(including 12 percent of its workforce), the highest percentage of any state.  Id. at 31.  The national 
average in the United States is for illegal aliens to comprise about four percent of a state’s 
population.  Id.  Given the fact that Arizona (as well as California, and almost Texas) has more than 
double the national average, Arizona’s knowledge of conditions on the ground must be given some 
level of deference.  See id.  Arizona deals with more than twice as high a percentage of illegal 
immigrants as the average state and, as such, should be the bellwether for determining whether 
federal action is effective enough to solve problems without state and local assistance.  See id.; 
Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1. 
 185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.  The Legal Arizona Workers Act contains 
many provisions which aim to improve federal, state, and local cooperation, thereby strengthening 
the federal system without any government stepping too firmly on the toes of another.  See e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(C) (requiring the attorney general to report any employed 
unauthorized aliens to both U.S. immigration and customs and local law enforcement agencies), 23-
212(H) (requiring the Arizona state courts to base decisions as to the legal status of aliens only on 
the federal government’s findings under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)), 23-212(J) (allowing for an affirmative 
defense if an employer can show good faith compliance with federal law). 
 186. For example, compliance with the Act’s verification requirements “establishes an 
affirmative defense that an employer did not intentionally or knowingly employ an unauthorized 
alien.”  §§ 23-212(J), 23-212.01(J).  This is merely an immediate, practical benefit for employers.  
Further benefits will be discussed infra. 
 187. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra  note 1, at 1 (citing the 
demand for cheap labor as a major force in bringing unauthorized aliens to Arizona). 
 188. See id.  See also H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5649, 5650 (“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally or, in the case of 
nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in violation of their status”). 
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agrees.189  While sanctioning employers will probably not eliminate 
illegal immigration by itself, it will force employers to refrain from 
blatantly disregarding the law and to employ more careful hiring 
practices.190  The good news for employers in all this is that compliance 
with the Act is fairly simple.191  Once the Act is complied with, 
employers are no longer at risk of unexpected liability.192  One study 
found that approximately 10 percent of workers submitted for 
verification were unauthorized to work in the United States.193  
Additionally, very few of those 10 percent challenge E-Verify’s initial 
finding of unauthorized status.194  Imagine the benefit for employers in 
weeding out this 10 percent before incurring liability.195  A further 
important, albeit somewhat tangential, benefit will help United States 
citizen workers because they will no longer be forced to compete with 
the usually lower-paid unauthorized aliens for jobs.196 
The decision by the Court of Appeals will also open up new 
avenues for future immigration reform, such as those Arizona was 
hoping the Act would lead Congress to implement.197  The election of 
President Barack Obama has put a familiar face, that of Janet 
Napolitano, in the forefront of this push for immigration reform as 
Secretary of Homeland Security.198  A powerful critic of the 
ineffectiveness of IRCA and the unwillingness of Congress to reform, 
Napolitano brings clear priorities to her new office.199  During her 
 
 189. See id.  The passage of IRCA, and in particular its employer sanctioning provisions, 
shows Congress believed that employers were at least partially responsible for what it perceived as 
the “problem” of illegal immigration.  See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
 190. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-212(J), 23-214, 23-
215. 
 191. See §§ 23-212(I), 232-212(J), 23-212.01(I), 23-212.01(J). 
 192. Id.  Verification of an employee’s status through the E-Verify system provides the 
employer with the shield of a rebuttable presumption that she did not violate the Act.  See §§ 23-
212(I), 232-212(J), 23-212.01(I). 
 193. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974-75 
(D. Ariz. 2007). 
 194. Id. at 975.  What this amounts to is that only one-tenth of 1 percent of verification 
requests results in a final, formal “unauthorized” finding.  Id. 
 195. See supra note 192. 
 196. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 46-49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5651-53. 
 197. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 3. 
 198. Daniel González and Sean Holstege, Napolitano Pick Signals Moderate Immigration 
Approach, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/11/21/ 20081121borderpolicy1121.html. 
 199. See id.; John Yaukey, Napolitano Outlines Immigration Policy, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 
Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/01/16/ 
20090116napolitano0116.html. 
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confirmation hearings, she did not go into extensive detail but expressed 
support for border fences in problem areas and using technology to track 
movement around the border.200  She also reiterated her support for 
punishing employers for hiring unauthorized workers.201  If Napolitano’s 
efforts do lead to the comprehensive immigration reform she wants, it 
will be interesting to see the results.202 
D. The Impact of Chicanos Por La Causa 
1.  Impact on Immigration Law 
One of the most important aspects of the court’s decision in 
Chicanos Por La Causa will not be immediately seen, because it 
concerns the case’s impact on the future of immigration law in the 
United States.203  Arizona’s hope is that Congress will eventually step in 
and fix the problems with current immigration law.204  The most obvious 
problem with the current law is its ineffectiveness.205  By allowing 
Arizona to enact its own employer sanctions—even through on its face, 
it is nothing more than a licensing law—the court has decided that 
Arizona can do something in the face of that ineffectiveness.206  Arizona 
fully expects other states to follow its lead and pass employer 
sanctioning laws similar to the Act.207  While that prediction has not 
come to pass en masse on the state level, many local governments have 
enacted similar laws.208  These laws have found mixed success against 
 
 200. Yaukey, supra note 199.  Among her other top priorities were “improving disaster 
response, enhancing transportation security and tracking emerging terrorist threats,” which are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Id.  The author wishes it to be clear he does not support the building 
of border fences. 
 201. Id.  (“You have to deal with illegal immigration from the demand side as well as the 
supply side. . . . You have deal with what is drawing people across the border, and that is a job”). 
 202. See Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 3. 
 203. The potential impact Arizona could have on immigration law, particularly reform of the 
current law, was one of the motivations behind the Act’s passage.  Id.   
 204. See id. at 1 (declaring immigration a “federal responsibility”). 
 205. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73 
(D. Ariz. 2007).  See also supra note 127. 
 206. See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (“. . . the 
power to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police 
powers . . .”).  See also Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 3 (“Because of 
Congress’ failure to act, states like Arizona have no choice but to take strong action to discourage 
the further flow of illegal immigration through our borders.”). 
 207. See id. (“Now that Arizona has acted, other states are likely to follow.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Jan. 
31, 2008) (upholding a city ordinance that sanctioned employers for hiring unauthorized aliens); 
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preemption challenges.209  However, in Gray v. City of Valley Park, the 
local law most similar to the Act was upheld by the district court against 
a facial challenge much like the one presented in Chicanos Por La 
Causa.210  The Chicanos Por La Causa decision is more important, 
however, because unlike the city ordinance in Gray, the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act was enacted by a state, which has quasi-sovereign powers 
in the federal system.211  By using its own regulatory powers, Arizona 
hopes to force Congress to reevaluate its current strategy for combating 
illegal immigration.212 
2.  Criticisms and Rebuttal 
Since its passage, the Act has been a lightning rod for criticism.213  
One of the major criticisms is that the E-Verify system is unreliable and 
that Congress kept the program voluntary at least partially for that 
reason.214  The voluntary nature of E-Verify is likely a contributing 
factor to any unreliability of the data; the more users feeding information 
into the system, the more accurate the information will be because one 
user can catch another user’s mistakes.215  Part of the concern over the 
 
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex., 2008) 
(overturning a city ordinance similar to the Act, except that the ordinance sanctioned landlords 
rather than employers); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Penn. 2007) 
(invaliding a similar city ordinance as preempted by IRCA).  For further discussion of Gray v. City 
of Valley Park, and why the Chicanos Por La Causa decision is more important, see infra notes 
210–12 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 208.  
 210. Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, slip op. at *1.  In Gray, the City of 
Valley Park, Missouri enacted two separate ordinances concerning illegal immigration.  Id.  One 
ordinance punished landlords for leasing to illegal immigrants; the other sanctioned employers for 
hiring them.  Id.  The landlord ordinance was later repealed, leaving only the employer sanctions 
provision to be challenged before the district court.  Id.  After arguments nearly identical to those 
put forth by the plaintiffs in Chicanos Por La Causa, the district court upheld the employer 
sanctioning ordinance.  Id. at *31.  Both preemption and due process issues were presented and 
resolved in much the same manner as in Chicanos Por La Causa.  Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  In Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court found standing for Massachusetts to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s non-
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.  Id.  The court’s grant of standing was based in part on 
“Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,” which provided the State with 
“special solicitude” in the Court’s analysis.  Id. at 518-20. 
 212. Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1, at 3. 
 213. See, e.g., Wake Up Arizona!, supra note 124. 
 214. See Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 38-42. 
 215. See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
Congress’s encouragement of E-Verify use).  See also Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria (Ariz. 
Contractors II), 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1055-57 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La 
Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing Congress’s desire for a more 
accurate verification system). 
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data’s reliability stems from the fact that E-Verify determines “whether a 
Social Security number presented by an employee is indeed a valid 
number,” but does not determine whether that number belongs to the 
employee presenting it.216  This might be a valid argument if there was 
better system available; however, there is not one.217  Mandatory use of 
E-Verify will make the system more reliable, not less reliable; that was 
Congress’s policy behind implementing the basic pilot programs in the 
first place.218  In addition, there are already programs available that will 
make E-Verify even more reliable in the long run.219 
Another criticism of the Act is that it will lead to increased 
discrimination, particularly on the basis of ethnicity and race.220  The 
fear is that employers will ensure they are not hiring unauthorized 
workers by refusing to hire any minorities at all.221  The circuit court 
rejected this argument for lack of evidence.222  Opponents of the Act are 
also concerned that the provisions allowing citizen-assistance in 
enforcement will lead to discrimination.223  This threat is overstated, 
because the Act provides for criminal liability for anyone who files a 
 
 216. Wake Up Arizona!, supra note 124. 
 217. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: E-Verify, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/ gc_1185221678150.shtm (last visited October 30, 2008).  
See also supra note 42.  Not only does E-Verify get the full, unquestioned endorsement of the 
Department of Homeland Security, it is also now required for any company contracting with the 
federal government.  Exec. Order No. 13465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33285 (June 6, 2008).  See also Ariz. 
Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d  968, 974 (D. Ariz. 2007) 
(“According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ‘E-Verify is currently the best means 
available for employers to verify electronically the employment eligibility of their newly hired 
employees.  E-Verify virtually eliminates Social Security mismatch letters, improves the accuracy 
of wage and tax reporting, protects jobs for authorized U.S. workers, and helps U.S. employers 
maintain a legal workforce.’”). 
 218. Ariz. Contractors II, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-57.  See also supra note 215 and 
accompanying text. 
 219. See Ariz. Contractors I, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 975.  Although E-Verify is still somewhat 
susceptible to fraud (just like the I-9 system), a piloting photographic screening tool, which would 
allow employers to identify fraud more easily and accurately is available to all users of E-Verify. Id.  
This tool should also help limit the potential for discrimination, discussed infra notes 220-28. 
 220. See e.g., Wake Up Arizona!, supra note 124; H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68-71 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672-5676. 
 221. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68-71.  “There is a potential chilling effect on hiring 
minority job applicants. The unfortunate guarantee that a business isn’t hiring an illegal worker 
could be simply not to hire applicants that would even be suspected of being from another country.”  
Wake Up Arizona!, supra note 213. 
 222. Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F. 3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2008).  See also supra 
notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
 223. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-212(B), 23-212.01(B) (allowing anyone to complain of 
a violation of the Act).  See also Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F. 3d at 862. 
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frivolous complaint.224  These concerns about potential discrimination 
are nothing new, however, as Congress worried greatly about 
discrimination when passing IRCA.225  The Immigration and Nationality 
Act contains sufficient protections against immigration-related 
employment discrimination.226  IRCA required the President to create a 
new office in the Justice Department to handle immigration-related 
employment practices to make sure discrimination would not become an 
issue.227  Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations 
supported these anti-discrimination goals.228  Furthermore, the ease of 
compliance with the Act makes discrimination even less likely because 
employers can quickly verify the statuses of potential employees, 
 
 224. §§ 23-212(B), 23-212.01(B) (“A person who knowingly files a false and frivolous 
complaint under this subsection is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor.”) 
 225. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68-71. 
 226. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1996).  This section prohibits employment “discrimination based on 
national origin or citizenship status.”  Id.  The discrimination prohibition reads in pertinent part: 
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to 
discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien, as defined in 
section 1324a(h)(3) of this title) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a 
fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from 
employment-- 
(A) because of such individual’s national origin, or 
(B) in the case of a protected individual . . ., because of such individual’s citizenship 
status. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1).  “Protected individual” is defined as either a citizen or national of the 
United States or “an alien who is lawfully admitted” to or granted asylum in the United States.   8 
U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3).  The section contains three exceptions: (1) employers with three employees or 
fewer, (2) discrimination covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (3) “discrimination because 
of citizenship status which is otherwise required in order to comply with law, regulation, or 
executive order, or required by Federal, State, or local government contract, or which the Attorney 
General determines to be essential for an employer to do business with an agency or department of 
the Federal, State, or local government.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2).  Despite these troubling 
exceptions, the Immigration and Nationality Act still provides the vast majority of potential 
employees with protection from discrimination so long as they are authorized to work in the United 
States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. 
 227. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 71. 
 228. See also Exec. Order No. 12989, 61 Fed. Reg. 6091, 6091 (Feb. 13, 1996) 
It remains the policy of this Administration to fully and aggressively enforce the 
antidiscrimination provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the fullest 
extent. Nothing in this order relieves employers from their obligation to avoid unfair 
immigration-related employment practices as required by the antidiscrimination 
provisions of section 1324(b) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1324b) and all other 
antidiscrimination requirements of applicable law, including the requirements of 8 
U.S.C. 1324b(a)(6) concerning the treatment of certain documentary practices as unfair 
immigration-related employment practices. 
Id.  This executive order was later amended by Executive Order No. 13,286 in 2003, but none of the 
changes affected the above language.  See Exec. Order No. 13286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619,10623-24 
(Feb. 28, 2003). 
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allowing them to remain equal-opportunity employers without using 
significantly more resources than before.229 
A final major criticism, and partly the basis for the Plaintiffs’ 
conflict pre-emption claims, is that the Act will lead to a loss of 
uniformity in immigration law.230  In enacting the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act, the State of Arizona has turned the tables on the federal 
government in this respect, placing the onus to act on Congress if it 
wishes uniformity.231  It even appears from Napolitano’s signing 
statement that goading the federal government into creating an effective, 
uniform national standard was one of the goals behind the Act’s 
passage.232  Put simply, none of these criticisms create a level of concern 
high enough to successfully sustain a facial challenge.233 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made the 
correct decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, upholding a statute 
sanctioning employers for knowingly or intentionally hiring 
unauthorized aliens.234  The court’s conclusion furthers Congress’s 
purpose by allowing another line of defense against the problem of 
unauthorized immigrants.235  The only reservation the circuit court 
 
 229. See supra notes 49, 191-92 and accompanying text. 
 230. Consolidated Opening Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant, supra note 28, at 3, 5.  According to 
the plaintiffs, the Act “establishes a state-wide scheme for sanctioning employers that allegedly 
employ aliens who are unauthorized to work . . . .  That scheme differs markedly from the uniform 
employer sanctions system Congress enacted as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986.”  Id. at 3. 
 231. See generally Letter from Janet Napolitano to Jim Weiers, supra note 1. 
 232. Id. at 3 (“For our country to have a uniform and uniformly enforced immigration law, the 
United States Congress must act swiftly and definitively to solve this problem at the national 
level.”). 
 233. See Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 869 (9th. Cir. 2008).  See also 
supra note 123. 
 234. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 869.  See also supra notes 107-23 and accompanying 
text; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F) (2008).  On July 24, 2009, the plaintiffs 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.  Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Candelaria, No. 09-115 (U.S. 
July 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2331990.  The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether to grant the 
petition; however, the Court has asked the Solicitor General to submit a brief detailing the Federal 
Government’s position on the issue.  Daniel González and Dan Nowicki, Justices May Hear 
Disputed Arizona Law, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/11/03/20091103sanctionslaw1103.ht
ml. 
 235. See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 45-49 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5649-53. 
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expressed was in limiting its opinion to cover only facial challenges.236  
However, there is little reason to expect that application and 
enforcement challenges would not also fail.237  The potential for the Act 
to conflict with federal law in application is limited by the Act itself, 
which forces the superior court to use only the federal government’s 
determination of an employee’s status as a basis for liability under the 
Act.238  It is also likely that enforcement and compliance will both be 
easier to achieve on the state level than the federal or local levels.239 
The court’s decision also increases the likelihood of action from 
Congress in regard to national immigration policy, which many believe 
to be outdated.240  The E-Verify system does have some reliability 
problems; however, without the court’s decision, Congress would have 
little impetus to fix those problems and improve the system.241  Most 
important, however, are the enhanced prospects for cooperation.242  This 
includes cooperation among the various levels of government in the 
United States and international cooperation between this country and 
those from which illegal immigrants come to the United States.243 
 
 236. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861. 
 237. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866.  See also supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
The plaintiffs raised the issue that an employer may be subject to different rulings from state and 
federal courts based upon the same hiring event.  Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866.  The 
court hints that issue preclusion may prevent such a result but notes that neither party addressed that 
issue.  Id. 
 238. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 23-212(H) (“On determining whether an employee is an 
unauthorized alien, the court shall consider only the federal government’s determination pursuant to 
8 United States Code § 1373(c).”). 
 239. See Huyen Pham, Local Dimensions of Immigration: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Our Changing Communities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303, 1310-11 (2008) (discussing 
implementation problems that local governments have with immigration laws). 
 240. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.  See also, Letter from Janet Napolitano to 
Jim Weiers, supra note 1.;  Pham, supra note 293, at 1310 (discussing the popularity of local 
immigration laws in light of public frustration with federal immigration policies). 
 241. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.  This increased motivation is in addition 
to the piloting photographic screening tool Congress has already created to improve E-Verify’s 
accuracy.  Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano (Ariz. Contractors I), 526 F. Supp. 2d  968, 975 
(D. Ariz. 2007). 
 242. See supra note 185. 
 243. See supra note 185.  During the hearings for IRCA, the House Judiciary Committee 
recognized the importance of international cooperation:  “The committee believes that the primary 
reason for the illegal alien problem is the economic imbalance between the United States and the 
countries from which aliens come, coupled with the chance of employment in the United States.”  
H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 52 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5656.  International 
cooperation could lead to a solution that will allow the United States to retain the benefits of 
unauthorized aliens without a “drain” on the economy and also help the economies of other 
countries improve so that more of those aliens stay in their home countries rather than risking 
coming to the United States for a better opportunity. 
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Congressional action is especially likely and, some would argue, 
important in the current economic climate.244  While perceptions of 
illegal immigrants’ value vary, a large segment of the American public 
believes illegal immigration is a problem.245  A large part of the reason 
that the illegal immigration problem is so complicated and why 
Congress has been so slow to reform federal immigration policy is 
because illegal immigrants are simultaneously a threat and asset to the 
United States’ economy.246  In these difficult economic times, other 
countries likely do not want their best and brightest citizens leaving to 
come to the United States because those economies would benefit 
greatly from such people remaining at home.247 
The proper place for the burden of verifying the employment 
eligibility of employees is with the employer.248  With the passage of the 
Legal Arizona Workers Act, the State of Arizona has allocated this 
burden without interfering with the goals and purposes of Congress as 
expressed in IRCA and its legislative history.249  By upholding the 
statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has reinforced the tenets of 
federalism in allowing a state to experiment with new and innovative 
 
 244. Id.  at 47.  (citing the importance of action on illegal immigration during tough economic 
times).   
 245. See generally Pham, supra note 239, at 1310 (discussing the popularity of local 
immigration laws).  There has long been a debate as to whether illegal immigration is a drain or a 
benefit to the United States’ economy.  See, e.g., ACLU ProCon.org, Are Illegal Immigrants 
Damaging America’s Economy and Security?, available at http://aclu.procon.org/ 
viewanswers.asp?questionID=713.  The Federation for American Immigration Reform claims 
unauthorized aliens are a drain on the economy because “[m]ost illegal aliens have low educational 
attainment, few skills, and they work for low wages, often in the underground economy where they 
pay no taxes on their earnings.”  Id.  There is also concern that the poorest, least educated American 
workers should not have to compete for jobs with unauthorized aliens.  Id.  On the other hand, the 
American Civil Liberties Union argues that illegal immigrants “create new jobs by forming new 
businesses, spend[] their incomes on American goods and services, pay[] taxes and rais[e] the 
productivity of U.S. businesses.”  Id.  It has also been argued that immigrants add to the economy 
because they come when they are “young and working” and often contribute to social security 
without collecting because they are often using fake social security numbers.  Id.  One impact that I 
hope this case has is that Americans rethink their perceptions of illegal immigrants and their value 
to American society and the economy. 
 246. See e.g., ACLU ProCon.org, supra note 245.  My sister worked in the restaurant industry 
for many years and is convinced that if the United States government removed all the unauthorized 
workers, the entire industry would be crippled. 
 247. See e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Pragmatically Managing Global Labor Migration?, 37 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006) (recognizing “the concern . . . that if the best and brightest of a poor 
country’s brains and brawn emigrate, economic development in countries of origin may be 
slowed.”). 
 248. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.  
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ways to solve a very complicated problem.250  This attempt to regulate 
illegal immigration on the state level is especially important in light of 
the complete failure of the federal government to find a workable 
solution.251  The Act’s many benefits will have a profound effect on 
employers, employees, and the future of immigration law in the United 
States.252  This case is an important first step on the long road to 
comprehensive reform of federal immigration law.253 
 
 250. See supra notes 168-85 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 186-212 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 124-233 and accompanying text. 
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